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1 Introduction
When insurance and nancial markets are incomplete, individuals often form partnerships to diversify
their risks. For instance, families - mainly in developing countries - often arrange for long-distance mar-
riages for the purpose of sharing production shocks, manufacturing employers often cushion temporary
shocks on prot by sharing with their workers, and di¤erent parties in related businesses sometimes
develop joint ventures to share resources and revenues for mutual benet (Townsend, 1994; Fafchamps
and Lund, 2003; Bigsten et al, 2003). When risk sharing is a primary concern in forming partnerships,
it is legitimate to ask how the agents should match to insure against risks. Do the evidences in the
marriage market or the nancial market reect the mitigation of an incomplete insurance market, or
are they boosted by other concerns at the cost of e¢ ciency in risk sharing?
In this paper, we examine the sorting patterns in a two-sided matching market where agents facing
di¤erent risks match to share them. It is known that when agents have di¤erent degrees of risk aversion,
negative assortative matching (NAM) arises because risk bearings are generally substitutes: a very risk-
averse female is a demanding buyer for insurance and a very risk-tolerant male is a ready seller for it
(Chiappori and Reny, 2006; Schulhofer-Wohl, 2006). Rather than employing di¤erent degrees of risk
aversion, our paper focuses on di¤erent risks that each agent faces. Since the Pareto frontier in a given
match does not have constant slope, standard type-complementarity conditions (Becker, 1973) cannot
be used in general. However, with respect to risk-sharing problems, it is known that when preference
belongs to the class of harmonic absolute risk aversion (HARA), the Pareto frontier in the monetary-
equivalent space is a straight line, or, in other words, the total surplus summarized by the certainty
equivalent is independent of how risk sharing is performed. In this case, the matching game permits
a transferable expected utility representation and the type-complementarity condition translates into
minimizing social risk premium.
We then consider two applications: one where risks are perfectly correlated and one where risks are
independent. In the systematic risk model, agents are ranked by their percentage of ownership of a
common risky asset. Because joint risk premium is a convex function of the joint size of the common
risk, it is extremely costly to pair two highly risky agents together. Hence, negative sorting is socially
preferable and stable. One may wonder to what extent the result of negative sorting depends on the
HARA assumption. As a robustness check, we show that, with general utility functions, NAM still
arises if the supports of all risks are not too large compared with agentsrisk-free incomes and/or if
risk tolerance is su¢ ciently linear.
In the idiosyncratic risk model, agents are ranked by their independent riskiness in the sense of
second-order stochastic dominance (SSD). NAM arises if the preference exhibits DARA and if riskier
background risk leads to more risk-averse behavior, but may fail to arise when riskier background risk
leads to more risk-tolerant behavior. There are four key points to note here. First, the conditions for
NAM have clear economic implications and are supported by empirical evidence. Guiso et al. (1996)
concluded from Italian survey data that a consumers perception of a riskier distribution of uninsurable
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human-capital wealth is negatively related to the proportion of risky assets held in his/her investment
portfolio. Second, the seemingly strong conditions for NAM to arise come from the fact that we are
looking for the equilibrium sorting patterns for any SSD-ordered risks. For a special case of the SSD
order where risks are ranked in the sense of SSD by taking the form of adding independent noise, we only
need HARA and DARA to guarantee NAM. Third, when risks are large with respect to agentsrisk-free
incomes, an SSD deterioration in the background risk may lead to more risk-tolerant behavior, and thus,
NAM may fail to arise in equilibrium. Fourth, the di¤erent results in the two applications suggest that
one should investigate carefully whether agents are sharing highly correlated risks or independent risks.
The results of this paper may help us to understand the composition of risk-sharing groups in
developing countries. Ghatak (1999) argued that PAM should arise because similar people will nd it
easier to monitor and enforce informal contracts. Empirical evidence, however, is mixed: on one hand,
Bacon et al. (2014) found evidence that individuals were more likely to positive assortative mate on
their risk attitude; and Arcand and Fafchamps (2012) also found solid evidence of positive sorting for
peers with respect to physical or ethnic proximity as well as wealth or household size. On the other
hand, Dercon et al. (2006) found little evidence of positive sorting in group-based funeral insurance.
Our results from the idiosyncratic model suggest that the risk-sharing e¤ect might drive matching to
be negative assortative and, therefore, o¤set the monitoring and enforcing e¤ects; however, when risks
are large compared with individualsrisk-free incomes, it is possible that the two e¤ects might work in
the same direction and drive matching to be positive assortative.
Our work contributes to the recent literature on the risk-sharing matching game. Since the e¢ cient
risk sharing rule is typically nonlinear, the risk-sharing matching game permits non-transferable utilities,
and thus, standard type-complementarity conditions cannot be used. Legros and Newman (2007)
noticed that the risk-sharing matching game admits a transferable utility representation when agents
have logarithmic or exponential utility functions. Schulhofer-Wohl (2006) generalized their ndings,
showing that the game admits a transferable utility representation when preferences are in the harmonic
absolute risk aversion class with identical shape (ISHARA). Both Legros and Newman (2007) and
Schulhofer-Wohl (2006) proved that the equilibrium sorting pattern is negative assortative on risk
preferences. Chiappori and Reny (2006) further showed that negative sorting over risk preferences is
robust under general utility functions. The key di¤erence between our work and the existing literature
is that our paper focuses on di¤erent risks that each agent faces rather than di¤erent degrees of risk
aversion. Among the papers on risk-sharing matching games, ours is one of the rst to investigate
sorting over agentsrisk exposure.1
There are two reasons we think examining riskiness is important. First, individual risk preferences
have not proved to be stable across di¤erent stimulus domains and situations. For example, the pre-
dictive power of investorsrisk taking heavily depends on whether their risk attitudes are elicited in an
1 In their recent paper, Jaramillo, Kempf and Moizeau (2013) studied the formation of risk-sharing coalitions where
individuals di¤er with respect to their risky exposure. The insurance scheme considered in their work is limited to equal
sharing regardless of agents initial incomes, while in our model, there is no barrier to e¢ cient insurance within the
household.
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investment-related context (Slovic, 1964; MacCrimmon and Wehrung, 1986, 1990; Schoemaker, 1990,
1993; Weber and Milliman, 1997). Second, because income riskiness presumably is easier to observe than
attitudes toward risk, one might expect to drive testable predictions concerning the role of risk-sharing
in the formation of partnerships much more easier if agents are ranked on the basis of riskiness.
Moreover, the results of our paper di¤er from those in the literature. Chiappori and Reny (2006)
rigorously proved that NAM arises if agents hold the same exogenous risky assets but di¤er in their risk
attitude. Following their results, Li, Sun and Chen (2013) showed that PAMmay arise if agentsincomes
are endogenous (also see Wang, 2013a). Wang (2013b) showed that the presence of moral hazard may
also lead to PAM. Our results show that without any other confounding factors such as endogenous
income or moral hazard, the counter-intuitive PAM may arise if agents di¤er in their idiosyncratic risks
instead of their risk preferences: while agents with highly risky assets always try to avoid matching
with other large, perfectly-correlated risks, they might prefer to match with other large, independent
risks.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the risk-sharing matching game.
Section 3 applies a monotonic transformation to this game and characterizes the stable match. Section
4 and 5 consider two applications, one where risks are perfectly correlated and the other where risks
are independent. Section 6 extends the model to allow individuals to have di¤erent incomes and face
di¤erent risks. Section 7 concludes the paper.
2 Risk-Sharing Matching Game
Consider a one-to-one matching market with two lines of agents. We denote them as N males fi =
1; :::; Ng and N females fj = 1; :::; Ng. Each agent is endowed with an exogenous risky income, denoted
by ~wi for male i and ~wj for female j. All agents are expected-utility maximizers with respect to the
homogeneous probabilistic belief, and identically risk-averse with vNM utility function u(c), which is
bounded and continuously di¤erentiable in consumption c, with u0(c) > 0 and u00(c) < 0.
Agents match in order to share risks. At period 0, each agent voluntarily matches with a mate from
the opposite side. Each partnership (i; j) will commit to rules for sharing their joint income, which
depends on the state of the world. At period 1, the value of all shocks are realized, and agents consume
according to the prior sharing rules. We rule out any search or coordination frictions, and there is no
limited commitment or asymmetric information. Denote ~zij  ~wi + ~wj as the joint income received
by the matched pair (i; j): Division (zij cij ; cij), which is associated with partnership (i; j) prior to the
realization of shocks, species individual consumptions to i and j under each realization of ~zij . Under
this agreement, is expected utility is Eu(~zij   cij(~zij)) and js is Eu(cij(~zij)):
Assume that risk is shared within each partnership in a Pareto-e¢ cient way, a situation in which no
agents expected utility can be strictly increased without decreasing his/her partners. A risk-sharing
rule cij() is a deterministic function that maps each realized value of ~zij to an individual consumption
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level for j. Given the random joint income ~zij associated with partnership (i; j), a risk-sharing rule
cij() is Pareto optimal if and only if there exists a scalar  2 R++ such that cij() solves the following
maximization problem:
max
fcij()g
fEu(~zij   cij(~zij)) + Eu(cij(~zij))g (1)
The set of Pareto optimal risk-sharing rules is called Pareto e¢ cient frontier.
Denition 1 A matching correspondence is an assignment of males to females. A stable match
species a matching correspondence and the associated risk-sharing rules for each partnership, which is
immune to coalitional deviations. That is, there does not exist a risk-sharing rule under which a male
and a female, who are not matched to one another, prefer each other to their current assignments.
Assume that incomes strictly di¤er within each side of the population; further assume that the mar-
ginal utility of consumption is bounded at autarky. The existence of stable matches has been established
by Legros and Newman (2007). Then there is a one-to-one matching of i to j. Under a positive/negative
assortative matching (PAM/NAM), the most risky male is matched with the most/least risky female,
the second-most risky male is matched with the second-most/least risky female, and so on. The formal
denition of the equilibrium matching pattern is stated as follows:
Denition 2 A stable match is positive (negative) assortative if and only if for any i; i0; j and j0,
such that i and i0 are matched with j and j0 respectively, we have
i0  i() j0  ()j:
3 Stable Match and Social Risk Premium
Beckers (1973) seminal paper provided a foundation for analyzing the competitive assignments of
partners with transferable utility. But in our risk-sharing matching game, the Pareto e¢ cient frontier
in the utility space within a given partnership does not necessarily have a constant slope, and thus
standard type-complementarity conditions cannot OKbe used in general. However, a simpler case
arises when it is possible to apply a monotonic transformation to the expected utility levels such that
the transformed Pareto e¢ cient frontier has a constant slope. In this case, the matching game permits
a transferable expected utility representation as dened below:
Denition 3 The risk-sharing matching game has a transferable expected utility representation if for
any random joint income ~zij, there exists a constant Cij such that u 1[Eu(cij(~zij))] + u 1[Eu(~zij  
cij(~zij))] = Cij for all Pareto optimal risk sharing rules cij().
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A central implication of the above denition is that, if the risk-sharing matching game has a transfer-
able expected utility representation, the joint output, Cij , in terms of the certainty equivalent, depends
only on the characteristics of the membersjoint income distribution ~zij . This output measure allows
agents to compare gains from potential partnerships they may acquire. In other words, Cij can be
treated as the joint monetary output associated with partnership (i; j). Similar to Becker (1973), the
condition for a stable match is to maximize the social output
P
i;j Cij , which is the sum of the out-
puts over all partnerships for a given matching correspondence. Denote the Joint Risk Premium as
ij = E~zij   Cij , and the associated Social Risk Premium as
P
i;j ij , that is, the sum of the joint
risk premium over all partnerships for a given matching correspondence. Then, the maximization of
the social output will be equivalent to the minimization the social risk premium.
The existence of transferable expected utility representation is subject to certain regularity condi-
tions. With respect to risk-sharing problems, it is known that when preference belongs to the HARA
class, the Pareto frontier in the monetary-equivalent space is a straight line, or, in other words, the
total surplus summarized by the certainty equivalent is independent of the way risk sharing is performed
(Schulhofer-Wohl, 2006).
Denition 4 Preference belongs to the HARA class if and only if absolute risk tolerance is a linear
function of consumption:
T (c) =
1

c+
1

(2)
where risk tolerance T (c) =  u0(c)=u00(c) > 0 is the reciprocal of the Arrow-Pratt measure of absolute
risk aversion.
In particular, preference exhibits decreasing/increasing absolute risk aversion (DARA/IARA)
if  > 0 ( < 0), it exhibits constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) if  ! 1, it exhibits
constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) if !1; and it exhibits risk neutral if  ! 0.
The results for HARA preference can be stated as follows:
Lemma 1 If the preference belongs to the HARA class, then the risk-sharing matching game has a
transferable expected utility representation .2
Proof. The proof can be found in Mazzoccos (2004) and Schulhofer-Wohls (2006) studies.
Because all agents have identical utility function, the solution to (1) when  = 1 is cij(zij) =
zij
2 .
That is, sharing the joint income equally is one of the Pareto optimal risk-sharing rules. According to
2Schulhofer-Wohl (2006) showed that the risk-sharing matching games admit a transferable expected utility represen-
tation if and only if preferences are in the class of identical shape harmonic absolute risk aversion (ISHARA). In other
words, agents can have di¤erent utility functions, but the slope of their risk tolerance must be the same: Ti (c) = 1 c+
1
i
.
This is equivalent to saying that all agents have the same HARA utility function, but with di¤erent initial wealth. We
discuss the case in which agents di¤er in both initial wealth and riskiness of their assets in Section 6.
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Denition 3, if the risk-sharing matching game has a transferable expected utility representation, the
joint output Cij , which is associated with partnership (i; j), does not depend on the risk-sharing rules.
Thus, without loss of generality, we can derive Cij by applying the particular risk-sharing rule cij(zij) =
zij
2 , which gives that Cij = 2u
 1Eu

~zij
2

. If we dene a new utility function v (c)  u   c2, then it
follows that Cij = v 1[Ev(~zij)]. Hence, v() can be interpreted as the utility function of a representative
agent for any matched pair (i; j). The joint output Cij and the joint risk premium ij = E~zij   Cij
are simply the certainty equivalent and risk premium of the representative agent, respectively. Finally,
using the denition of v() and condition (2), one can quickly conrm that preference u() belongs to
the HARA class if and only if v() also belongs to the same class.
The results for the HARA preferences immediately follow:
Lemma 2 If the preference belongs to the HARA class and if the joint risk premium ij is sub(super)modular
in (i; j), then any stable matching of the risk-sharing matching game will be positive (negative) assor-
tative on the partnersincome riskiness.
Proof. See Appendix.
4 Sorting over Systematic Risk
In this section, we consider the application in which risks are perfectly correlated. Agents are ranked by
their holdings of a common risky asset. That is, male is income is ~wi = w0+ki~x and female js income
is ~wj = w0 + kj ~x, with ki < ki+1 and kj < kj+1. Dene kij  ki + kj . With ij = E~zij   v 1[Ev(~zij)]
and ~zij = 2w0 + kij ~x, we have ij as a function of kij and w0: ij = (kij ; w0). As a result of market
competition, stable match guarantees the minimization of the social cost of risk. According to Lemma
2, stable match will be positive (negative) assortative on risk sizes (ki; kj) if
@2(kij ; w0)
@k2ij
 0( 0);
i.e., the joint risk premium is concave (convex) in the size of the joint risk exposure. As suggested by
Eeckhoudt and Gollier (2001), multiplicative risk is self-aggravating in the sense that the cost curve of
risk (kij ; w0) is convex in the unit holdings of such risk kij . Here, if the joint risk premium is a convex
function of the joint size of the common risk, it is extremely costly to pair two highly risky agents
together, and thus NAM is socially preferable and stable. Thus, we have the following proposition:
Proposition 1 If the preference belongs to the HARA class, then the joint risk premium is convex in
the size of joint risk exposure and, therefore, the stable match of the risk-sharing matching game is
negative assortative over the riskiness of the agentsincome.
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Proof. Because ij = E~zij   v 1[Ev(2w0 + kij ~x)], we have
@2ij
@k2ij
=  
v0(v 1(Ev(2w0 + kij ~x)))E
 
v00(2w0 + kij ~x)~x2
  (Ev0(2w0 + kij ~x))2 v00(v 1(Ev(2w0+kij ~x)))v0(v 1(Ev(2w0+kij ~x)))
[v0(v 1(Ev(2w0 + kij ~x)))]2
Therefore, @
2ij
@k2ij
 0 i¤
  v
00(v 1(Ev(2w0 + kij ~x)))
[v0(v 1(Ev(2w0 + kij ~x)))]2
   E(v
00(2w0 + kij ~x)~x2)
[E(v0(2w0 + kij ~x)~x)]2
(3)
Solving for v (c) from (2) and substituting into (3), we nd that there will be NAM i¤
[E(T (2w0 + kij ~x)
 
~x)]2  E(T (2w0 + kij ~x) (1+) ~x2)ET (2w0 + kij ~x)1 
which holds as a direct application of the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality.
One may wonder to what extent the result of negative sorting depends on the HARA assumption.
Notice that the result of Proposition 1 immediately follows from the fact that the risk premium is
convex in the risk size. Without the HARA assumption, Eeckhoubt and Gollier (2001) show that the
risk premium may not be convex in the size of risk and thus, Proposition 1 may fail. However, as a
robustness check, we are able to show that with general utility functions, NAM still arises if the supports
of all risks are not too large compared with the agentsrisk-free incomes and/or if the risk tolerance is
su¢ ciently linear.3
In their paper, Chiappori and Reny (2006) show that competitive forces will lead risk-sharing groups
to be composed of individuals who are rather di¤erent in their risk preferences. Here, consistent with
their result, we show that it will lead risk-sharing groups to consist of agents with rather di¤erent risk
sizes. There are two reasons we believe riskiness is an important factor to explore. First, in practice,
individual risk preferences have not proven to be stable across di¤erent stimulus domains and situations.
This creates a di¢ culty in assessing agentsrisk attitudes because di¤erent methods and procedures
often result in di¤erent classications. Second, because risk sizes are much easier to track down, one
may expect to drive testable predictions much more easily.
In the next section, which concerns the two factors that determine agentsrisk-taking behavior, i.e.,
agentsrisk preferences and risk exposures, we will show that there is a fundamental di¤erence in their
e¤ects: while a highly risk-averse agent always prefers to match with a less risk-averse agent for better
insurance, an agent with a very risky asset may prefer to match with another agent with a very risky
asset for the purpose of risk sharing.
3With general preferences, the utility (under any monotone transformation) is not fully transferable between partners.
In this case, Legros and Newman (2007) presented su¢ cient conditions for monotone matching. Applying their general-
ized di¤erence conditions, we are able to show that NAM still arises under fairly reasonable assumptions:The proof can
be found in the Appendix.
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5 Sorting over Idiosyncratic Risks
In this section, we consider the application when risks are idiosyncratic. Agents are ranked by their
independent riskiness in the sense of second-order stochastic dominance (SSD). That is, male is income
is wmi = w0 + ~"
m
i and female js income is w
f
j = w0+ ~"
f
j , where ~"
m
i+1
SSD
- ~"mi and ~"fj+1
SSD
- ~"fj . Again,
the joint risk premium is given by ij = E~zij   v 1[Ev(~zij)] with ~zij = 2w0 + ~"mi + ~"fj . Thus, in this
case, we have ij as a function of the joint risk ~"mi +~"
f
j and the initial wage w0: ij = 

~"mi + ~"
f
j ; w0

.
Before proceeding, we show through examples that sorting in either direction is possible without further
restrictions other than HARA preference.
5.1 Preliminary Examples
Example 1 (CARA utility). Suppose there are two males m1 and m2 endowed with w0 + ~"mi , i = 1, 2
and two females f1 and f2 endowed with w0 + ~"
f
j , j = 1, 2, where ~"
m
i and ~"
f
j are independent. Because
all agents have identical CARA utilities, given the initial wage level w0, ij is additive over (~"mi ;~"
f
j ):


~"mi + ~"
f
j ; w0

=  (~"mi ; w0) + 

~"fj ; w0

:Therefore, ij is both (but not strictly) supermodular and
submodular in (i; j), which leads to arbitrary matching.
Example 2 (IARA utility). Suppose instead that all agents have quadratic utility u(c) = c   c22 . For
the sake of simplicity, we assume that m1 and f1 are endowed with certain income w0, and that m2 and
f2 are endowed with risky incomes w0+~"m and w0+~"f , respectively, where ~"m and ~"f are independently
distributed with zero mean and variance 2m and 
2
f , respectively. Notice that for quadratic utility, the
mean-variance approach is exact. We have joint risk premium ij = w0  (1 
p
(1  w0)2 + V ar(~zij)).
We can easily show that, for any given initial wage w0, ij is concave in V ar(~zij), which implies that
PAM is stable.
Example 3 (DARA utility). Suppose alternatively that all agents have logarithm utility function
u (c) = ln c. m1 and f1 are endowed with certain income w0 = 3, and m2 and f2 are endowed with risky
income 3+~"m and 3+~"f , respectively, where ~"m and ~"f are i.i.d., and Pr (~"m = 1) = Pr (~"m =  1) = 12 .
A simple calculation gives 21 = 12 = 0:17 and 22 = 0:41. Therefore, we have 11 + 22 > 12 + 21,
and thus, NAM is stable.
The key insights from these examples are that all sorting patterns are possible with idiosyncratic
risks and that DARA may be necessary for NAM to arise.
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5.2 General Results
In order to nd general results, we can simply look at the 2  2 case in which two males are matched
with two females4 . Via Lemma 2, NAM is stable if the following supermodular condition holds:
(~"m1 + ~"
f
1 ; w0) + (~"
f
2 + ~"
m
2 ; w0)  (~"m1 + ~"f2 ; w0) + (~"m2 + ~"f1 ; w0) (4)
Because ~"m2
SSD
- ~"m1 , ~"f2
SSD
- ~"f1 and ~"mi s, ~"
f
i s are independent, we have the orders: ~"
f
2 + ~"
m
2
SSD
-
~"m1 + ~"
f
2
SSD
- ~"m1 + ~"f1 and ~"
f
2 + ~"
m
2
SSD
- ~"m2 + ~"f1
SSD
- ~"m1 + ~"f1 . Thus, condition (4) holds if the joint risk
premium is convexin the riskiness of idiosyncratic risks.5 The rst lemma in this section is given as
follows.
Lemma 3 If the preference belongs to the HARA class, then the joint risk premium (~x;w0) is convex
in w0.
Proof. Similar to the proof of Proposition 1.
One implication of Lemma 3 is that if the agents all face the same risks but di¤er in their initial
wealth levels, NAM will arise.
Before proceeding to the general conditions for negative or positive sorting, we introduce the follow-
ing denition:
Denition 5 A utility function u1 is more risk-averse than another utility function u2 in the sense
of Ross if there exist a positive constant  and a di¤erentiable function g with g0  0 and g00  0 such
that
u1 = u2 + g:
Risk aversion in the sense of Ross is a stronger concept than risk aversion in the sense of Pratt. It is
easy to verify that  u
00
1
u01
  u002u02 always holds in this case. To help in further understanding the concept
of risk aversion in the sense of Ross, we denote i (~"2 ! ~"1; w) as the price that agent i is ready to
pay to replace lottery ~"2 with lottery ~"1 at wealth level w, i.e.,
Eui (w + ~"2) = Eui (w   (~"2 ! ~"1; w) + ~"1) : (5)
4The reason for discussing only the 22 case is merely for expositional purposes. If there is a complete order of agents
risks, i.e., "m1  "m2  : : :  "mN and "f1  "f2  : : :  "fN , then our conditions for NAM/PAM can immediately apply in
the case in which there are equal numbers of males and females, as well as in the case of the matched agents when there
are unequal numbers of males and females, although in the latter case, the identities of the agents who are left unmatched
depend on the distribution of the population.
5Suppose f is a convex function with one variable. Then for any x1  min (x2; x3)  max (x2; x3)  x4 such that
x1 + x4 = x2 + x3 we must have f(x1) + f(x4)  f(x2) + f(x3).
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Ross (1981) showed that agent u1 is more risk-averse than agent u2 in the sense of Ross if and only
if agent u1 is ready to pay more than agent u2 for any SSD reduction in risk (i.e., 1 (~"2 ! ~"1; w) 
2 (~"2 ! ~"1; w) ; 8w, ~"2 and ~"1, with ~"2
SSD
- ~"1).
Denition 6 A utility function u exhibits DARA in the sense of Ross if  (~"2 ! ~"1; w1)   (~"2 ! ~"1; w2) ;
8w1,w2, ~"2 and ~"1, with ~"2
SSD
- ~"1 and w1  w2.
Denition 7 A utility function u satises the property that any SSD deterioration in the background
risk increasing risk aversion in the sense of Ross if for any ~"2
SSD
- ~"1, U2 is more risk-averse than U1
in the sense of Ross, where
Ui(x)  Eu(x+ ~"i), for i = 1; 2:
The above notation and results allow us to derive the following proposition:
Proposition 2 If the preference belongs to the HARA class and exhibits DARA in the sense of Ross
and any SSD deterioration in the background risk increases risk aversion in the sense of Ross, then the
risk-sharing matching game will be negative assortative on agentsincome riskiness.
Proof. Dene  (~"2 ! ~"1; w) as the price that agent v is ready to pay to replace lottery ~"2 with lottery
~"1 at wealth level w. From the concept of risk premium and the denition of  (~"2 ! ~"1; w), we have
v (w0    (~"2; w0)) = Ev (w0 + ~"2)
= Ev (w0   (~"2 ! ~"1; w0) + ~"1)
= v (w0   (~"2 ! ~"1; w0)  (~"1; w0   (~"2 ! ~"1; w0)))
from which we obtain
 (~"2; w0) = (~"2 ! ~"1; w0) + (~"1; w0   (~"2 ! ~"1; w0)) (6)
The two sides of the above equation represent two equivalent ways of eliminating risk ~"2. One is to
eliminate ~"2 once and for all, and agent v is willing to pay  (~"2; w0) for this. The other is to eliminate ~"2
step by step, rst replacing ~"2 with a smaller risk ~"1 at the price of (~"2 ! ~"1; w0) and then eliminating
~"1 at the price of  (~"1; w0   (~"2 ! ~"1; w0)).
A stable match is NAM if
(~"m1 + ~"
f
1 ; w0) + (~"
m
2 + ~"
f
2 ; w0)  (~"m1 + ~"f2 ; w0) + (~"m2 + ~"f1 ; w0) (7)
Applying (6), we can rewrite the above inequality ash
(~"m1 + ~"
f
1 ; w0) + (~"
m
2 + ~"
f
2 ! ~"m1 + ~"f2 ; w0) + (~"m1 + ~"f2 ; w1)
i

h
(~"m1 + ~"
f
2 ; w0) + (~"
m
2 + ~"
f
1 ! ~"m1 + ~"f1 ; w0) + (~"m1 + ~"f1 ; w2)
i
(8)
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where w1 = w0   (~"m2 + ~"f2 ! ~"m1 + ~"f2 ; w0) and w2 = w0   (~"m2 + ~"f1 ! ~"m1 + ~"f1 ; w0).
Now we prove
(~"f2 + ~"
m
2 ! ~"m1 + ~"f2 ; w0)  (~"m2 + ~"f1 ! ~"m1 + ~"f1 ; w0) (9)
Consider agent 1 with utility function V1 (x) = Ev(x + ~"
f
1 ) and agent 2 with V2 (x) = Ev(x + ~"
f
2 ).
As in Gollier (2001), we dene the risk premium 1(~"m2 ! ~"m1 ) as the price that agent 1 is willing
to pay to replace ~"m2 with ~"
m
1 ; and we dene 2(~"
m
2 ! ~"m1 ) as the counterpart for agent 2. Then
(~"m2 + ~"
f
1 ! ~"m1 + ~"f1 ; w0) = 1(~"m2 ! ~"m1 ) and (~"f2 + ~"m2 ! ~"m1 + ~"f2 ; w0) = 2(~"m2 ! ~"m1 ): (9) holds
i¤ V2 is more risk averse than V1 in the sense of Ross, i.e., an SSD deterioration in the background risk
makes the agents more risk averse in the sense of Ross.
Given (9), (8) holds ifh
(~"m1 + ~"
f
1 ; w0) + (~"
m
1 + ~"
f
2 ; w1)
i

h
(~"m1 + ~"
f
2 ; w0) + (~"
m
1 + ~"
f
1 ; w2)
i
(10)
which, by applying (6), can be rewritten ash
(~"m1 + ~"
f
1 ; w0) + (~"
m
1 + ~"
f
1 ; w4) + (~"
m
1 + ~"
f
2 ! ~"m1 + ~"f1 ; w1)
i

h
(~"m1 + ~"
f
1 ; w3) + (~"
m
1 + ~"
f
2 ! ~"m1 + ~"f1 ; w0) + (~"m1 + ~"f1 ; w2)
i
where w4 = w1   (~"m1 + ~"f2 ! ~"m1 + ~"f1 ; w1), w3 = w0   (~"m1 + ~"f2 ! ~"m1 + ~"f1 ; w0). If utility exhibits
DARA in the sense of Ross, we have (~"m1 + ~"
f
2 ! ~"m1 + ~"f1 ; w1)  (~"m1 + ~"f2 ! ~"m1 + ~"f1 ; w0). Thus, we
only need to show:h
(~"m1 + ~"
f
1 ; w0) + (~"
m
1 + ~"
f
1 ; w4)
i

h
(~"m1 + ~"
f
1 ; w2) + (~"
m
1 + ~"
f
1 ; w3)
i
(11)
To prove (11), we rst show that
w0 + w4  w2 + w3 (12)
Using the expressions to substitute for w0; w2; w3 and w4, (12) can be rewritten ash
(~"m2 + ~"
f
2 ! ~"m1 + ~"f2 ; w0) + (~"m1 + ~"f2 ! ~"m1 + ~"f1 ; w1)
i

h
(~"m2 + ~"
f
1 ! ~"m1 + ~"f1 ; w0) + (~"m1 + ~"f2 ! ~"m1 + ~"f1 ; w0)
i
Via (9), we know that (~"f2 + ~"
m
2 ! ~"m1 + ~"f2 ; w0)  (~"m2 + ~"f1 ! ~"m1 + ~"f1 ; w0). Moreover, the fact
that the utility is DARA in the sense of Ross and w0 > w1 implies that (~"m1 + ~"
f
2 ! ~"m1 + ~"f1 ; w1) 
(~"m1 + ~"
f
2 ! ~"m1 + ~"f1 ; w0). Hence, the above inequality and therefore (12) hold.
Now, inequality (11) follows by noticing that (i)  is decreasing and convex in w0; (ii) w0 > max(w2; w3) >
min (w2; w3) > w4; and (iii) inequality (12) holds.
Proposition 2 provides a su¢ cient condition for NAM: if the preference belongs to the HARA class
and exhibits DARA in the sense of Ross and a higher background risk leads to more risk-averse behavior,
then negative sorting is stable. Thus, in facing risks from the male side, female 2 (taking ~"f2 as her
background risk) behaves in a more risk-averse way than female 1 (taking ~"f1 as her background risk).
Therefore, in order to match with the less risky male 1, female 2 is ready to o¤er male 1 a higher
12
premium over male 2 than female 1 is. Similarly, in order to match with the less risky female 1, male
2 is ready to o¤er female 1 a higher premium over female 2 than male 1 is. Hence, negative sorting is
stable.
One may wonder how restrictive the condition is in Proposition 2. On the theoretical front, Gollier
(2001)6 proved that u1 is more risk averse than u2 in the sense of Ross if and only if there exists a
scalar  such that:
8x1; x2 : u
00
1 (x1)
u002 (x1)
   u
0
1 (x1)
u02 (x1)
:
Applying the above condition, one can easily show that u exhibits DARA in the sense of Ross if
there exists a scalar , such that
p (w + y)    r (w + y0) , 8y; y0; (13)
where p (w) =  u
000(w)
u00(w) denotes the measure of absolute prudence and r (w) =
 u00(w)
u0(w) denotes the
measure of absolute risk aversion.
Under our HARA assumption regarding preference, the utility function can be written as u (c) = 
c+ 
1 
. Then, (13) becomes
 + 1
(w + y) + 
   
(w + y0) + 
, 8y; y0.
Suppose the relevant range of wealth is bounded on the interval [a; b]. Then, the above inequality
becomes
 + 1
b+ 
 
a+ 
,
which can be simplied to
b  a  1

+
1

a. (14)
When the range of the relevant wealth is not too large, the utility exhibits DARA in the sense of
Ross.
Now, we derive the conditions under which any SSD deterioration in the background risk increases
risk aversion in the sense of Ross. Consider agent 1 with utility function V1 (x) = Ev(x+ ~"
f
1 ) and agent
2 with V2 (x) = Ev(x + ~"
f
2 ). The condition of Proposition 2 requires that V1 be more risk averse than
V2 in the sense of Ross. That is, there exists a scalar  such that ,
Ev00(w1 + ~"2)
Ev00(w1 + ~"1)
   Ev
0(w2 + ~"2)
Ev0(w2 + ~"1)
;8w1; w2: (15)
For small risk ~"i, we have:
Ev00(w + ~"i)  v00 (w) + 12v0000 (w)2i
Ev0(w + ~")  v0 (w) + 12v000 (w)2i
:
6Proposition 28, Ch 8, page 122.
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Substituting into the condition (15), we have:
v0000 (w1)
v00 (w1)
   v
000 (w2)
v0 (w2)
, 8w1; w2:
Or equivalently:
t (w1) p (w1)    p (w2) r (w2) , 8w1; w2 (16)
where t (w) =  u
0000(w)
u000(w) denotes the measure of absolute temperance, p (w) =
 u000(w)
u00(w) denotes the
measure of absolute prudence, and r (w) =  u
00(w)
u0(w) denotes the measure of absolute risk aversion.
Under our specication for the utility function, (16) becomes:
 + 2 
w1 +


2   
w2 +


2 ;8w1; w2
which holds if the support of income realizations is su¢ ciently narrow. In general, for large risks,
deriving the conditions for equation (15) is quite complicated and we leave it for future work.
Although the conditions in Proposition 2 impose strict restrictions on preference, as well as risk
size, the economic implications are clear and supported by the empirical evidence. Guiso et al. (1996)
concluded from Italian survey data that a consumers perception of a riskier distribution of uninsurable
human-capital wealth is negatively related to the proportion of risky assets held in his/her investment
portfolio. It is also worthwhile to point out that the seemingly strong conditions for NAM come from
the fact that we are looking for sorting patterns for any SSD ordered risks. In this sense, the conditions
for PAM could be equally if not more restrictive. In the next subsection, we will show that HARA
and DARA are su¢ cient to guarantee NAM if risks are ranked in the sense of SSD taking the form of
adding independent noise.
5.3 SSD Risks with Independent Noise
To see a less restrictive condition for monotone sorting, we consider a special case in which ~"m2 is
an increase in risk of ~"m1 in the sense of SSD taking the form of adding independent noise ~"
m, and
similarly for ~"f2 and ~"
f
1 : That is, assume male 1 and female 1 are endowed with ~w
m
1 = w0 + ~"
m
1 and
~wf1 = w0+~"
f
1 , respectively; and assume male 2 and female 2 are endowed with ~w
m
2 = w0+~"
m
1 +~"
m and
~wf2 = w0 + ~"
f
1 + ~"
f , respectively. All idiosyncratic risks and noises are independently distributed with
E~"m = E~"f = 0. Here, in order to characterize the equilibrium sorting pattern, we need to compare
(~"m1 + ~"
f
1 ; w0) + (~"
m
1 + ~"
f
1 + ~"
m + ~"f ; w0) and (~"m1 + ~"
f
1 + ~"
m; w0) + (~"
m
1 + ~"
f
1 + ~"
f ; w0).
The following proposition characterizes the equilibrium sorting pattern:
Proposition 3 If the preference belongs to the HARA class and exhibits DARA, and agents are ranked
by their independent riskiness in the sense of SSD taking the form of adding independent noise, then
the risk-sharing matching game will be negative assortative on the agentsincome riskiness.
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Proof. See Appendix.
The concept of risk vulnerability is important in understanding the results of negative sorting. In
their seminal paper, Gollier and Pratt (1996) introduced the concept of risk vulnerability as a basic tool
for examining the e¤ect of an unfair background risk on an agents attitude towards other independent
risks. In particular, utility is risk vulnerable if and only if the introduction of an unfair risk increases
the risk premium of every independent risk.7 Gollier and Pratt (1996) have listed several necessary
and su¢ cient conditions for risk vulnerability, among which, under HARA, one su¢ cient condition is
DARA8 . Risk vulnerability guarantees that SSD deterioration taking the form of adding independent
noise increases the cost of existing independent risks. DARA implies that SSD deterioration taking the
form of adding independent noise increases the cost of the deterioration itself. Multiple risks are, in
this sense, self-aggravating, and thus negative sorting is socially preferable and stable.
A special example in this case occurs when m1 and f1 are endowed with certain income wm1 = w
f
1 =
w0 (i.e., ~"m1 = ~"
f
1 = 0) and m2 and f2 are endowed with risky income ~w
m
2 = w0 + ~"
m and ~wf2 = w0 + ~"
f .
Then NAM arises if (~"m + ~"f ; w0)  (~"m; w0) + (~"f ; w0): the risk premium of the sum of risks is
larger than the sum of the risk premiums of the risks, which is indeed the case if utility is risk vulnerable
and exhibits DARA.
5.4 An Example of PAM under HARA and DARA
The following example helps us to understand, in general, why we need restrictions beyond HARA and
DARA for NAM to arise. In particular, if SSD ordered risks do not take the form of adding independent
noise, NAM may fail to arise, even when the preference belongs to the HARA class and exhibits DARA.
Example 4 Consider the utility function v (c) =
p
c, and assume w0 = 0, ~"
f
1 = (0;
1
2 ; 1;
1
2 )
9 , ~"m1 =
(0; 12 ;x;
1
2 ), ~"
f
2 = (0;
1
2 ; 0:5;
1
4 ; 1:5;
1
4 ), ~"
m
2 = (0;
1
2 ;
x
2 ;
1
4 ;
3x
2 ;
1
4 ), where x > 0. ~"
f
2 is SSD-dominated by ~"
f
1
by introducing a zero-mean risk to "f1 = 1; ~"
m
2 is SSD-dominated by ~"
m
1 by introducing a zero-mean risk
to "m1 = x. Recall that Cij = v
 1Ev (~zij). After careful calculation, we obtain C11, C12, C21, and C22
as functions of x.10 Dene f (x) = (C11 + C22)   (C12 + C21). Then, NAM arises if f (x) < 0, while
PAM arises if f (x) > 0. It can be shown that there exists a threshold bx, such that f (x) < 0 for x <
7The mathematical denition of risk vulnerability is as follows. Dene the generalized risk premium ~"(~x;w) of risk
~x in the presence of initial wealth w and background risk ~" as the price that an agent with utility function u would be
willing to pay to avoid risk ~x at an uncertain position w + ~": Eu(w + ~"+ ~x) = Eu(w + ~"  "(~x;w)). Dene (~x;w) as
the standard risk premium of risk ~x, which is determined by the following equation: Eu(w + ~x) = Eu(w + ~"  (~x;w)).
We say that u is risk vulnerable if and only if ~"(~x;w)  (~x;w) for all w and unfair ~" (E~"  0).
8See Gollier and Pratt (1996) Corollary 1, page 117.
9This formula means that Pr(~"f1 = 0) = Pr(~"
f
1 = 1) =
1
2
. Similar explanations apply to other random variables.
10C11 =
 
1
4
p
x+ 1
4
+ 1
4
p
x+ 1
2
; C12 =

1
8
q
x
2
+ 1
8
q
3
2
x+ 1
4
p
1 + 1
8
q
1 + x
2
+ 1
8
q
3
2
x+ 1
2
;
C21 =

1
8
p
0:5 + 1
8
p
1:5 + 1
4
p
x+ 1
8
p
x+ 0:5 + 1
8
p
x+ 1:5
2
;
C22 =

1
8
q
x
2
+ 1
8
q
3
2
x+ 1
8
p
0:5 + 1
16
q
x
2
+ 0:5 + 1
16
q
3x
2
+ 0:5 + 1
8
p
1:5 + 1
16
q
x
2
+ 1:5 + 1
16
q
3x
2
+ 1:5
2
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bx and f (x) > 0 for x > bx. This suggests that NAM is more likely to arise if the support of risks is
su¢ ciently narrow, while PAM may arise if the support of risks is su¢ ciently large.
In this example, we show that for large risks ( x being su¢ ciently large), HARA and DARA are not
su¢ cient to guarantee NAM. The key point to note here is that an SSD deterioration in the background
risk may reduce an agents degree of risk aversion. Dene rj (w) =
 Ev00(w+~"fj )
Ev0(w+~"fj )
as the Arrow-Pratt
coe¢ cient of risk aversion for an agent with utility function v in the presence of background risk ~"fj .
It can be shown that, there exists a threshold value w^, such that r1 (w) > r2 (w) for w < w^ and
r1 (w) < r2 (w) for w > w^11 . This suggests that the agent is more locally risk averse at w < w^ in the
presence of background risk ~"f1 than in the presence of background risk ~"
f
2 . So, in facing risks from the
male side, female 1 (taking ~"f1 as her background risk) may behave in a more risk-averse way than female
2 (taking ~"f2 as her background risk)
12 . Therefore, in order to be matched with the less risky male 1,
female 1 may be willing to o¤er male 1 a higher premium over male 2 than female 2 is. Similarly, in
order to match with the less risky female 1, male 1 may be willing to o¤er female 1 a higher premium
over female 2 than male 2 is. As a result, PAM may arise in equilibrium.
In their paper, Chiappori and Reny (2006) showed that NAM always arises if agents di¤er only in
their risk attitude. Following their results, Li, Sun, and Chen (2013) showed that PAM may arise if
agents can make an e¤ort to reduce their income riskiness. Wang (2013b) showed that the presence of
moral hazard may also lead to PAM. Here, without any other confounding factor such as endogenous
income or moral hazard, counter intuitive PAM may arise if agents di¤er in terms of their idiosyncratic
risks: while agents with highly risky assets always attempt to avoid being matched with other large
perfectly correlated risks, they may prefer to be matched with other large independent risks.
This result helps us to understand the composition of risk-sharing groups in developing countries.
Ghatak (1999) argued that PAM should arise because similar people will nd it easier to monitor and
enforce informal contracts. Empirical evidence, however, is mixed: on one hand, Bacon et al. (2014)
found evidence that individuals were more likely to positive assortative mate on their risk attitude;
and Arcand and Fafchamps (2012) also found solid evidence of positive sorting for peers with respect
to physical or ethnic proximity as well as wealth or household size. On the other hand, Dercon et al.
(2006) found little evidence of positive sorting in group-based funeral insurance. Our results suggest
that, the risk-sharing e¤ect may drive matching to be negative assortative and therefore o¤set the
monitoring and enforcing e¤ects; however, when risks are large compared with individuals risk-free
incomes, it is possible that the two e¤ects may work in the same direction and drive matching to be
positive assortative.
11Notice that r1 (w) = 12
1
2
w
  3
2 + 1
2
(1+w)
  3
2
1
2
w
  1
2 + 1
2
(1+w)
  1
2
and r2 (w) =
1
2
w
  3
2 + 1
4
(0:5+w)
  3
2 + 1
4
(1:5+w)
  3
2
1
2
w
  1
2 + 1
4
(0:5+w)
  1
2 + 1
4
(1:5+w)
  1
2
.
12Notice that female 1 is not uniformly more risk averse than female 2. Indeed, she is locally more risk averse than
female 2 for w < w^ but less risk averse than female 2 for w > w^. Therefore, there is no uniform prediction for the two
agentsrisk-taking behavior. Depending on the properties of the risk taken, female 1 may or may not behave in a more
risk-averse way than female 2.
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6 Extension: Multidimensional Matching
In general, individuals have di¤erent incomes and face di¤erent risks. When agentstypes are multidi-
mensional, there is not a complete order of types. We therefore only consider two cases with complete
order, that is, the order of agentsriskiness goes in exactly the same or exactly the opposite direction
as their risk-free incomes. We have shown via Lemma 3 that if agents all face the same risks but
di¤er in their risk-free incomes, NAM will arise. We have also shown via Propositions 1 and 2 that if
agents all have the same risk-free income but di¤er in the risks they face, NAM will arise under certain
restrictions. Thus, if types are two dimensional, a natural guess would be that NAM will arise based
on riskiness because higher risk-free incomes seem to go in the same direction as higher riskiness for
DARA utilities. We now proceed to show that in fact, both NAM and PAM can arise in this case.
6.1 The Case of Systematic Risk
We rst study a multidimensional matching game in which risks are perfectly correlated. Agents are
characterized by a pair (wi; ki). Here we only consider two cases with complete order: (i) agents with
lower risk-free incomes hold larger shares of the common asset, i.e., ki < ki+1 and wi > wi+1, kj < kj+1
and wj > wj+1 and (ii) agents with higher risk-free incomes hold larger shares of the common asset,
i.e., ki < ki+1 and wi < wi+1, kj < kj+1 and wj < wj+1.
In the rst case, consider male i, i0 and female j, j0, with i < i0, and j < j0. Remember that NAM
arises if
ij + i0j0  i0j + ij0 (17)
where ij = E~zij v 1[Ev(wij+kij ~x)] is the joint risk premium for (i; j); wij = wi+wj and kij = ki+kj .
Notice that ij can be written as a function of wij and kij : ij(wij ; kij). To simplify, we drop the
subscript ijand write the function of joint risk premium as (w; k) = E~z   v 1[Ev(w + k~x)], whose
properties are listed below:
Lemma 4 @
2(w;k)
@k2  0, @
2(w;k)
@w2  0, @
2(w;k)
@w@k  0.
Proof. See Appendix.
The rst inequality is actually Proposition 1. The second inequality implies that if the agents all
hold the same amount of the common asset, there will be NAM on the risk-free income. Higher income
leads to higher tolerance for risk under DARA; thus if we take risk-free income as a proxy for agents
degree of risk aversion, then Lemma 4 coincides with Chiappori and Renys (2006) argument that stable
match is negative assortative on agentsrisk attitude. The following lemma is also useful:
Lemma 5 Let f(x; y) be twice continuously di¤erentiable in the domain [0;1) [0;1), with f11  0,
f22  0 and f12  0, where f11 = @
2f
@x2 f22 =
@2f
@y2 and f12 =
@2f
@x@y . Then for any 0  x1  min (x2; x3) 
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max (x2; x3)  x4, and y1  maxfy2; y3g  minfy2; y3g  y4  0, such that
x1 + x4 = x2 + x3 (18)
y1 + y4 = y2 + y3 (19)
we must have
f(x1; y1) + f(x4; y4)  f(x2; y2) + f(x3; y3) (20)
Proof. See Appendix.
The two lemmata immediately yield the following proposition:
Proposition 4 If the preference belongs to HARA class and exhibits DARA, and agents with lower
risk-free incomes hold larger sizes of common risky assets, then NAM is stable.
Proof. Note that ij + i0j0 = (wij ; kij) + (wi0j0 ; ki0j0) and i0j + ij0 = (wi0j ; ki0j) + (wij0 ; kij0).
Because wij = wi + wj and kij = ki + kj , we have wij + wi0j0 = wi0j + wij0 and kij + ki0j0 = ki0j +
kij0 . Because in this case we must have wij > max (wi0j ; wij0) > min (wi0j ; wij0) > wi0j0 and kij >
max (ki0j ; kij0) > min (wi0j ; wij0) > ki0j0 , by Lemmata 4 and 5, the following inequality holds: ij +
i0j0  i0j + ij0 . Thus, NAM arises in equilibrium.
Remark: If agents with higher risk-free incomes hold larger sizes of common risky assets, then both
NAM and PAM can arise in equilibrium. Through two examples, we show that both NAM and PAM
are possible. (a) The NAM example. Suppose agent is risk-free income is given by wi = w0 + kia,
where ki is the size of the risk held by agent i and a is a constant number. In this example, all agents
risk-free income and size of risks pairs (wi; ki)s lie on the same line. Dene ~y = a+ ~x. Then, agent is
income can be written as wi + ki~x = w0 + ki~y. This specication brings us back to the case in which
all agents have the same risk-free income w0 and hold di¤erent amounts of a common asset ~y. Thus,
NAM is stable. (b) The PAM example. Consider a 2  2 case in which the utility function belonging
to the HARA class takes the following form: v (w) = lnw. Assume the common risk ~x is a small risk
with zero mean and variance 2. Applying Arrow-Pratt approximation, we have (w; k)  12 1w k22.
Let wm0 = w
f
0 = 1, k
m
1 = k
f
1 = 1, k
m
2 = k
f
2 = 10, w
m
1 = w
m
0 + k
m
1 , w
m
2 = w
m
0 + k
m
2 , w
f
1 = w
f
0 + k
f
1 and
wf2 = w
f
0 + k
f
2  x, with x  1. In this example, the points (wm1 ; km1 ), (wm2 ; km2 ) and (wf1 ; kf1 ) lie on the
same line wi = w0+ki, while the wealthier females risk-free income and size of risk pair (w
f
2 ; k
f
2 ) lie o¤
of the line. The parameter x measures how far away the point (wf2 ; k
f
2 ) is from the line wi = w0 + ki .
If x = 1, then the point (wf2 ; k
f
2 ) lies exactly on the line wi = w0 + ki, and we are back in our example
of NAM. A simple calculation gives 11 + 22  (12 + 21) = 12
h
22
4 +
202
(12+10x)  

112
13 +
112
13+10x
i
 2.
It can be shown that there exists a threshold bx > 1, such that 11+22  (12 + 21) > 0 for x < bx and
11 + 22   (12 + 21) < 0 for x > bx. Thus, NAM arises if x < bx and PAM arises if x > bx. The result
suggests that if agentsrisk-free income and size of risks pairs lies su¢ ciently away from the same line,
then PAM arises.
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6.2 The Case of Idiosyncratic Risks
We now study a multidimensional matching game in which the risks are independent. Suppose agent
is income is wi + ~"i. Dene ~i = ~"i +wi  w0. Then, agent is income can be written as w0 +~i. If the
newly dened risks ~i can still be ranked in terms of SSD, i.e., ~1
SSD
% ~2
SSD
% : : :
SSD
% ~N , then we are
back to our idiosyncratic model seen in Section 5. The problem is that, even if the original risks can
be ranked in the sense of SSD (~"1
SSD
% ~"2
SSD
% : : :
SSD
% ~"N ), the newly dened risks ~is may not have an
SSD order. Here we consider two cases with a complete order: (i) agents with lower risk-free incomes
face higher risks, i.e., ~"i
SSD
% ~"i+1 and wi  wi+1, ~"j
SSD
% ~"j+1 and wj  wj+1 and (ii) agents with lower
risk-free incomes face lower risks, i.e., ~"i
SSD
- ~"i+1 and wi  wi+1, ~"j
SSD
- ~"j+1 and wj  wj+1.
Proposition 5 If the preference belongs to the HARA class and exhibits DARA, any SSD deterioration
in the background risk increases risk aversion in the sense of Ross, and if agents with lower risk-free
incomes face higher idiosyncratic risks, then NAM is stable.
Proof. The newly dened risks ~i still have the SSD order ~1
SSD
% ~2
SSD
% : : :
SSD
% ~N , and therefore the
result follows immediately from Proposition 2.
Remark: The following example suggests that, if agents with lower risk-free incomes face smaller
idiosyncratic risks, both NAM and PAM could be stable. Consider a 22 case in which utility function
belonging to the HARA class takes the form v (c) = ln c. Assume that the idiosyncratic risks ~"is are small
with zero mean and variance 2i . Applying Arrow-Pratt approximation, we have ij  12
2i+
2
j
wij
. Let
wm1 = w
f
1 = 1, w
m
2 = w
f
2 = 10, 
2
1m
13 = 21f = 
2, 22m = 10
2 and 22f = x
2, with 2 being arbitrarily
small and x > 1. Note that larger x means that female 2, who has higher risk-free income than female
1, faces larger idiosyncratic risk. A simple calculation gives 11+22 (12 + 21) = 12

9
22   9220x
2,
which is positive if x < 10 and negative if x > 10. Thus, NAM arises if x < 10, and PAM arises if
x > 10. The example illustrates that PAM is likely to arise in equilibrium if agents who have higher
risk-free income face risks that are su¢ ciently large (x is su¢ ciently large).
7 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we explore the sorting patterns in a two-sided matching market where agents facing
di¤erent risks match to share them. We show that the competitive sorting pattern crucially depends
on the interaction between risks. While negative sorting almost always arises when risks are perfectly
correlated, the counter-intuitive positive sorting may arise when risks are independent. In the case
where risks are independent, negative sorting tends to arise if a riskier background risk leads to more
risk-averse behavior. Our ndings enrich the literature on assortative matching, and to the best of our
13The formula 21m means that the variance of male 1s income is 
2
1m.
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knowledge, are among the rst attempts to investigate sorting over agentsrisk exposure. Our results
help in understanding the composition of risk-sharing groups in developing countries. Behind the mixed
empirical evidence of sorting patterns, there might be a trade-o¤ between the risk-sharing e¤ect and
the monitoring and enforcing e¤ects.
The present research can be extended along several lines. Firstly, in many instances, the riskiness
of income is not entirely exogenous but partially a choice variable. In the developed world, individuals
usually choose their professions and investments as a function of their risk preferences and their abilities.
There could then be a trade-o¤ between competing for the most suitable partner for the purpose of
risk sharing and for the motive of risk control. Li, Sun and Chen (2013) and Wang (2013a) studied
endogenous risks and showed that PAM may arise in equilibrium. However, they only considered the
case where preferences belong to the CARA class and incomes were subjected to normal distributions.
It is therefore worthwhile to explore more general cases. Secondly, an interesting extension would
permit agents to renegotiate sharing rules posterior to matching. Li, Sun, and Wang (2015) introduced
a bargaining stage and showed that PAM may arise in equilibrium. Thirdly, the e¤ect of risk factors
on matching e¢ ciency is also relevant for nancial securities14 or joint venture agreements. Our model
indicates that it is costly to pair two highly risky assets together, which is associated with a high
social cost of risk that the investors have to pay. The recent trend of overconcentration of risks in
the subordinated debts raises our concern that, for the issuers, the main purpose of securitization is
not to share risks with investors, but to keep the risk concentrated so that they can achieve as much
leveraging as possible (Acharya and Richardson, 2010). Further studies are needed in the context of
nancial securities and institutions.
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8 Appendix
8.1 Proof of Lemma 2
Proof. First, recall that ij being supermodular is equivalent to Cij being submodular. Then we prove
the lemma by contradiction. Suppose Cij is submodular and NAM does not arise. This means that
there exist i < i0 and j < j0, such that, in equilibrium, male i is matched with j and male i0 is matched
with female j0. Denote the equilibrium certainty equivalent of the four agents by Ci, Cj , Ci0 and Cj0
respectively. We have Ci + Cj = Cij and Ci0 + Cj0 = Ci0j0 . Because Cij is submodular, we must have
Ci0j +Cij0 > Cij +Ci0j0 , which implies that either Ci0j > Ci0 +Cj or Cij0 > Ci+Cj0 holds but not both
(which contradicts the fact that Ci0j + Cij0 > Cij + Ci0j0). If Ci0j > Ci0 + Cj , then i and j0 are both
better o¤ if they deviate and are matched together; if Cij0 > Ci +Cj0 , then i0 and j are both better o¤
if they deviate and are matched together. This contradicts our assumption that the matching is stable.
Similarly, one can prove that PAM arises if ij is submodular.
8.2 Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. The following denition is useful for the proof of this proposition:
Denition 8 (Gollier and Pratt, 1996) The generalized risk premium ~"(~x;w) of risk ~x in the
presence of initial wealth w and background risk ~", is the price that the representative agent would be
willing to pay to avoid the risk ~x at an uncertain position w+~": Ev(w+~"+ ~x) = Ev(w+~" "(~x;w)),
where ~x and ~" are independent.
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Gollier (2001)15 proved that risk aversion in the sense of Ross is a su¢ cient condition for the
comparative risk aversion to be preserved in the presence of a background risk. That is, if agent u1 is
more risk-averse than agent u2 in the sense of Ross, then agent u1 behaves in a more risk-averse way
than agent u2 in the presence of background risk. In technical terms, this means that if u1 = u2 + g,
then 1~"(~x;w)  2~"(~x;w) 8~x, ~", where i~"(~x;w) is the generalized risk premium of agent ui. We derive
a useful equivalence for the generalized risk premium. For risks ~x, ~y and ~z, by the above denition, we
have
Ev(w  ~x(~y + ~z; w) + ~x) = Ev(w + ~x+ ~y + ~z)
= Ev(w  ~x+~y(~z; w) + ~x+ ~y)
= Ev(w  ~x+~y(~z; w) ~x(~y; w  ~x+~y(~z; w)) + ~x)
from which it follows that
~x(~y + ~z; w) = ~x+~y(~z; w) + ~x(~y; w  ~x+~y(~z; w)) (21)
In particular, when ~x = 0, the above equation is written as
(~y + ~z; w) = ~y(~z; w) + (~y; w  ~y(~z; w)) (22)
That is, the costs of multiple risks can be decomposed into the cost of the rst risk evaluated in the
presence of the second risk and the cost of the second risk evaluated with a sure reduction in wealth
due to the existence of the rst risk.
A stable match is negative assortative if
(~"m1 + ~"
f
1 ; w0) + (~"
m
1 + ~"
f
1 + ~"
m + ~"f ; w0)
 (~"m1 + ~"f1 + ~"m; w0) + (~"m1 + ~"f1 + ~"f ; w0)
which under (22) is equivalent to
(~"m1 + ~"
f
1 ; w0) + ~"m1 +~"
f
1
(~"m + ~"f ; w0)
+ (~"m1 + ~"
f
1 ; w0  ~"m1 +~"f1 (~"
m + ~"f ; w0))
 ~"m1 +~"f1 (~"
m; w0) + (~"
m
1 + ~"
f
1 ; w0  ~"m1 +~"f1 (~"
m; w0))
+ ~"m1 +~"
f
1
(~"f ; w0) + (~"
m
1 + ~"
f
1 ; w0  ~"m1 +~"f1 (~"
f ; w0))
(23)
By applying (21), we have
~"m1 +~"
f
1
(~"m + ~"f ; w0)
= ~"m1 +~"
f
1+~"
f (~"
m; w0) + ~"m1 +~"
f
1
(~"f ; w0  ~"m1 +~"f1+~"f (~"
m; w0))
(24)
Under risk vulnerability we have
~"m1 +~"
f
1+~"
f (~"
m; w0)  ~"m1 +~"f1 (~"
m; w0) (25)
15See Chapter 8, proposition 25, page 118.
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Since DARA is preserved under the generalized risk premium, we have
~"m1 +~"
f
1
(~"f ; w0  ~"m1 +~"f1+~"f (~"
m; w0))  ~"m1 +~"f1 (~"
f ; w0) (26)
Combining (24), (25), and (26), we have
~"m1 +~"
f
1
(~"m + ~"f ; w0)  ~"m1 +~"f1 (~"
m; w0) + ~"m1 +~"
f
1
(~"f ; w0). (27)
Under DARA, (~"m1 + ~"
f
1 ; w0) is decreasing in w0; which gives
(~"m1 + ~"
f
1 ; w0  ~"m1 +~"f1 (~"
m + ~"f ; w0))
 (~"m1 + ~"f1 ; w0  ~"m1 +~"f1 (~"
m; w0) ~"m1 +~"f1 (~"
f ; w0))
(28)
Combining (23) and (27), the stable match satises NAM if
(~"m1 + ~"
f
1 ; w0) + (~"
m
1 + ~"
f
1 ; w0  ~"m1 +~"f1 (~"
m + ~"f ; w0))
 (~"m1 + ~"f1 ; w0  ~"m1 +~"f1 (~"
m; w0)) + (~"
m
1 + ~"
f
1 ; w0  ~"m1 +~"f1 (~"
f ; w0))
Under (27) and (28), a su¢ cient condition is (~"m1 + ~"
f
1 ; w0) being convex in w0, which is indeed the
case according to Lemma 3.
8.3 Proof of Lemma 4
Proof. The proof of @
2(w;k)
@k2  0 has already been given in the proof of Proposition 1. The proof of
@2(w;k)
@w2  0 is similar to the proof of @
2(w;k)
@k2  0. The proof of @
2(w;k)
@w@k  0 is more complicated.
Using the expression of (w; k), after careful calculation, we have @
2(k";w0)
@k@w0
 0 being equivalent to
E(Tv (w + k~x)
 
~x)E(Tv (w + k~x)
 
)  E(Tv (w + k~x) (1+) ~x)ETv (w + k~x)1  (29)
For  = 1, the above inequality is equivalent to
Cov

Tv (w + k~x)
 1
; Tv (w + k~x)
 1
~x

 0
However, we know that Tv (w + kx)
 1 is decreasing and Tv (w + kx)
 1
x is increasing when  = 1.
Hence, the above inequality holds.
Let us rst examine a case with discrete income distribution, in which continuous income distribution
is a limiting case. Consider the probability distribution characterized by p (x = xk) = pk with x1 <
x2 < ::: < x1. Denote tk = Tv (w + kxk). The necessary and su¢ cient condition for (29) is written asX
k
pkt
 
k xk
X
k
pkt
 
k 
X
k
pkt
 (+1)
k xk
X
k
pkkt
1 
k
which after rearranging is equivalent toX
k>l
X
l
pkpl

t k xkt
 
l + t
 
l xlt
 
k   t (+1)k xkt1 l   t (+1)l xlt1 k

 0
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The above holds for any discrete income distribution i¤ for all xk, xl,
t k xkt
 
l + t
 
l xlt
 
k   t (+1)k xkt l   t (+1)l xlt k  0
which, dividing both sides by t k t
 
l , is equivalent to
xk + xl   t 1k xktl   t 1l xltk  0
which is independent from . We already know that (29) holds for  = 1; hence, the above inequality
must hold. Consequently, (29) holds for all .
8.4 Proof of Lemma 5
Proof. Without the loss of generality, we assume that 0  x1  x2  x3  x4 (otherwise, one can
always change the subscripts of x2 and x3).
Suppose y2 < y3. Because f12  0 and x2  x3, we have
f(x2; y3)  f(x2; y2)  f(x3; y3)  f(x3; y2)
or
f(x2; y3) + f(x3; y2)  f(x2; y2) + f(x3; y3)
Thus, to prove the lemma, it su¢ ces to show that
f(x1; y1) + f(x4; y4)  f(x2; y3) + f(x3; y2)
which means that we only need to prove (20) for the case in which y2  y3. That is, without a loss of
generality, we can suppose that y1  y2  y3  y4.
Because f12  0 and y4  y1, we have
f(x2; y4)  f(x1; y4)  f(x2; y1)  f(x1; y1)
or
f(x1; y1) + f(x2; y4)  f(x1; y4) + f(x2; y1) (30)
Because f11  0, f is convex with respect to x, for any given y. According to (18), we must have
f(x1; y4) + f(x4; y4)  f(x2; y4) + f(x3; y4) (31)
Similarly, because f12  0 and x2  x3, we have
f(x2; y1)  f(x2; y2)  f(x3; y1)  f(x3; y2)
or
f(x2; y1) + f(x3; y2)  f(x2; y2) + f(x3; y1) (32)
Also, because f22  0, f is convex with respect to y, for any given x. According to (19)
f(x3; y1) + f(x3; y4)  f(x3; y2) + f(x3; y3) (33)
Our result (20) immediately follows from summing (30), (31), (32), and (33).
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8.5 Proposition 1 with General Preference
Consider the 22 case in which there are two malesm1,m2 and two females f1, f2: Dene (mi; fj)s joint
risk exposure as kij , ki+kj . We normalize k11 = 1, and thus k12 > 1, k21 > 1 and k22 = k12+k21 1.
Thus, (mi; fj)s joint income is ~zij = 2w0 + kij ~x. Using V (kij ; u), we can dene the indirect utility
function of the maximization problem as follows:
V (kij ; u) = max
c
E[u(zij   c)] s.t. E[u(c)]  u
and we have
V (kij ; u) = max
c;
E[u (zij   c) +  (u (c)  u)] (34)
where  = (kij ; u) > 0 is a function of the joint size of risk, kij , and the minimum expected utility
level guaranteed for female u. V (kij ; u) represents the maximum payo¤ mi can get given fjs payo¤
being no less than u. The rst-order conditions require perfectly correlated marginal utilities for the
matched agents:
u0 (zij   c) = u0 (c) , 8zij (35)
under the following constraint:
Eu (c) = u: (36)
Denote the solution to (35) and (36) as cij = c (zij ; u) = c(x; kij ; u)16 and ij = (kij ; u). For the NTU
matching game, Legros and Newman (2007) have established the generalized di¤erence conditionfor
monotone sorting. Applying their condition, we have the following lemma:
Lemma A1 For the arbitrary distribution of risk sizes, the stable match of the risk-sharing matching
game is negative assortative on agentslevels of systematic risk exposure if for 8k12, k21 > 1 and
8u,
V (k12; V (1; u))  V (k12 + k21   1; V (k21; u)) (37)
The proof can be found in Legros and Newman (2007). The term V (1; u) represents the maximum
expected utility for m1 given that f1 receives u: Keeping m1s payo¤ at the same level but matching
him with f2 would generate expected utility V (k12; V (1; u)) for f2: Thus, the LHS of (37) represents
m1s willingness to pay (in expected utility terms) to be matched with f2 instead of f1 given that f1
receives u, and the RHS is the counterpart for m2. Hence, in competing for f2 rather than f1, m1 can
always outbid male m2 and still leave more (compared to being matched with f1) for himself. Before
proceeding, the following lemma provides a condition equivalent to (37).
16The last equality is due to the fact that zij is a function of kij and x: zij = 2w0 + kijx.
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Lemma A2 For the arbitrary distribution of risk sizes, the stable match of the risk-sharing matching
game is negative assortative on agentssizes of systematic risk exposure if for 8k12, k21 > 1 and
8u,
E[u0 (ci1) ~x]  E[u0 (ci2) ~x] (38)
where ci1 = c(x; ki1; u) and ci2 = c(x; ki2; u) are solutions to (35) and (36).
Proof. We rst prove that
E[u0 (c21) ~x]  E[u0 (c22) ~x] (39)
Dene  (k21) , V (k12 + k21   1; V (k21; u)). From Lemma A1, a su¢ cient condition for NAM is that:
for 8k12, k21 > 1 and 8u,
0 (k21) = V1 (k22; V (k21; u)) + V2 (k22; V (k21; u))V1 (k21; u)  0 (40)
where Vl() denotes the partial derivative of V w.r.t. the l-th argument, and k22 = k12 + k21   1. Note
that (40) is the Legros and Newman General Di¤erential Condition (2007: Proposition 3).
Because V1 (kij ; u) = E[u0 (zij   cij) ~x] and V2 (kij ; u) =  ij , a standard implication of the envelope
theorem, (40) is equivalent to
E[u0 (z22   bc22) ~x]  22E[u0 (z21   c21) ~x]  0
for 8k12, k21 > 1 and 8u, where bc22 is the solution to (35) and (36) found by replacing u with bu =
V (k21; u). Taking the expectation of (35)~x yields
E[u0 (z22   c22) ~x] = 22E[u0 (c22) ~x]
Also, recall that V (k21; u) = bu, via which we obtain z21   c21 = bc21, where bc21 is the solution to (35)
and (36) by replacing u with bu = V (k21; u). Hence, (40) is equivalent to:
E[u0 (bc22) ~x]  E[u0 (bc21) ~x]  0
for 8k12, k21 > 1 and 8u. Because the choice of u is arbitrary, so is bu. The above inequality is equivalent
to (39). Also, because (39) holds for any k21 < k22, (38) holds via the same logic.
The intuition behind (38) is clear. A female who receives an expected utility level of u valuates
the market stock ~x by employing her marginal utility as a shadow price, which reects the maximum
price (in expected utility terms) she is willing to pay for an extra unit of joint risk exposure. Thus, the
benet of a less risky agent being matched to a highly risky partner must exceed the benets conferred
on a riskier agent for NAM to arise. In other words, (39) states that in competing for m2; which will
result in higher joint risk exposure as compared to with m1, f1 can always outbid f2 as a consequence
of the higher valuation of extra risk exposure.
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Alternatively, the condition of (38) is equivalent to: for 8k12, k21 > 1 and 8u,17
E[u00 (cij)
@cij
@kij
~x]  0 (41)
Lemma A3 Inequality (41) holds for 8k12, k21 > 1, u and ~x, if and only if the following inequality
holds: for 8k12, k21 > 1, u and ~x,
E(TiTj)E(~x
2)  E(Ti~x)E(Tj ~x) (42)
where Ti , T (z   c) and Tj , T (c).
Proof. Fixing u and solving from (35) yields c as a function of , kij and x, i.e., cij = c (; kij ; x).
Substituting into (36) yields
Eu(c((kij)); kij ; x) = u (43)
from which we can solve for  as a function of kij , i.e., ij =  (kij). Hence,
@cij
@kij
= c1
0 + c2, where
cl denotes the partial derivative of function c w.r.t. the l-th argument. Taking the log of both sides of
(35) and taking the total di¤erentiation yields c1 =
T (c)T (z c)
(T (c)+T (z c)) , c2 =
T (c)x
T (c)+T (z c) , c3 =
T (c)kij
T (c)+T (z c) .
Taking the total derivative of (43) w.r.t. kij yields 
0 =  Eu
0(c)c2
Eu0(c)c1
. After substituting, we nd that for
8k12, k21 > 1 and 8u, E[u00 (cij) @cij@kij ~x]  0 holds i¤ for 8, 8kij and any distribution of ~x,
E
u0 (c)TiTj
Ti + Tj
E
u0 (c) ~x2
Ti + Tj
 Eu
0 (c)Tj ~x
Ti + Tj
E
u0 (c)Ti~x
Ti + Tj
As the above inequality is expected to hold for the arbitrary distribution of ~x; we normalize kij = 1:
For any distribution ~x with p.d.f.  (x), we can dene a new distribution ~x with p.d.f.  (x) =
 (x) u
0(c)
Ti+Tj
=
R
 (x) u
0(c)
Ti+Tj
dx, under which the above inequality with distribution ~x can be rewritten as
follows: for 8, 8kij and any distribution of ex ,
ETiTjE~x
2
  ETiexETj ~xv
Because the distribution of ~x is arbitrary, this inequality is equivalent to (42).
Note that if partnersabsolute risk tolerance is linearly dependent, i.e., there exists a constant B,
such that for 8x, we have Ti = BTj , then (42) can be rewritten as ET 2i E~x2  (ETi~x)2, which holds as
a direct implication of the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality. This leads to the following proposition:
Proposition A1 T 00 = 0 is su¢ cient for NAM to arise.
Proof. We want to prove that T 00 = 0 ) Ti = BTj . If T 00 = 0; we can express tolerance as a linear
function of consumption: T (c) = 1 c +
1
 . Solving for u
0(c) = D1T (c)
  , where D1 is a constant,
17Note that Ci1 and Ci2 only di¤er in regard to the term k, with ki1 < ki2.
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combining with the F.O.C. of the Pareto optimization (35) yields
cij() =



1   1

+ zij
1 + 
 1

Substituting the above into the expression of risk tolerance yields
T
 
cij

=

 + zij


1 + 
 1

 ; T  zij   cij =  1  zij + 


1 + 
 1

 (44)
Let B = 
 1
 , and we immediately have Ti = BTj .
The above proposition suggests that when utility belongs to the HARA class, i.e., risk tolerance is
linear, T (c) = 1 c+
1
 , the matching pattern is negative assortative. It also suggests that (42) is more
likely to hold when the relationships between potential partnersrisk tolerances are su¢ ciently linear
over the relevant range of wealth. Thus, we naturally require support of the relevant risky incomes being
somewhat small and/or T 00 being su¢ ciently close to zero. For instance, when ~x is small risk w.r.t. w0,
partnersabsolute risk tolerances can be approximated by a linear relationship, which is exact in the
case of TU.
Before looking further for the necessary or su¢ cient conditions for (42) to hold, let us examine
a case with discrete income distribution, in which continuous income distribution is a limiting case.
Consider the probability distribution characterized by p (x = xk) = pk with x1 < x2 < ::: < x1.
Denote Tik = T (z (xk)  c (xk)), Tjk = T (c (xk)). We can establish the following lemma:
Lemma A4 An equivalent condition of (42) is that: for 8xk, xl,
Tik
xk
  Til
xl

Tjk
xk
  Tjl
xl

 0 (45)
Proof. The necessary and su¢ cient condition for NAM (42) is written asX
k
pkTikTjk
X
k
pkx
2
k 
X
k
pkTikxk
X
k
pkTjkxk
which after rearranging, is equivalent toX
k>l
X
l
pkpl
 
TikTjkx
2
l + TilTjlx
2
k   (TikTjl + TilTjk)xkxl
  0
The above holds for any discrete income distribution i¤ for all xk, xl, we have
(Tikxl   Tilxk) (Tjkxl   Tjlxk)  0 (46)
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Suppose that the above conditions are not met. Then, there must exist an xk and an xl such that
(Tikxl   Tilxk) (Tjkxl   Tjlxk) < 0. Let the distribution be such that p (x = xk) = p (x = xl) = 12 . We
then have ET 2j E~x
2 = 14 (TikTjl + TilTjk)xkxl, and hence ET
2
j E~x
2 < (ETj ~x)
2, which contradicts (42).
Dividing both sides by (xlxk)2, (46) can be written as (45).
Obviously, (45) holds if xk > 0 and xl < 0. Hence, for NAM to arise, we only need conditions to
guarantee that (45) holds for xk > 0, xl > 0 and xk < 0, xl < 0, where xk, xl belong to the support of
relevant risks. A su¢ cient condition is that both the function T (c(x))x and the function
T (z(x) c(x))
x are
monotonely increasing or decreasing in x for x > 0 and for x < 0, where x belongs to the support of
relevant risks. The following proposition states the fundamental resultsdisentangling e¤ect from risk
preference and from risk sizes for the equilibrium sorting pattern of the NTU risk-sharing matching
game.
Proposition A2 There exists an interval [x; x], with  2w0  x < 0 and x > 0, such that NAM arises
if all the supports of the risks are subsets of [x; x]. Moreover, 1) if utility exhibits DARA, then
the interval is [ 2w0; x], and 2) if utility exhibits IARA, then the interval is [x;+1].
Proof.
@
@x
T (c (x))
x
=
Tj
x2 (Ti + Tj)
(T 0 (c)x  (Ti + Tj)) (47)
@
@x
T (z (x)  c (x))
x
=
Ti
x2 (Ti + Tj)
(T 0 (z   c)x  (Ti + Tj)) (48)
When x! 0, we have @@x T (c(x))x !  1 and @@x T (z(x) c(x))x !  1. By continuity, there exist x < 0
and x > 0 such that T (c(x))x and
T (z(x) c(x))
x are decreasing on the interval [x; 0) and on the interval
(0; x], respectively.
If utility exhibits DARA, i.e., T 0  0, combining this with (47) and (48), we nd that both T (c(x))x
and T (z(x) c(x))x are negative for x < 0. Hence, the only restriction on the lower bounds of the risks is
to ensure that consumption is non negative, i.e. x =  2w0.
If utility exhibits IARA, i.e., T 0  0, combining this with (47) and (48) we have that both T (c(x))x
and T (z(x) c(x))x are negative for x > 0. Hence, there is no restriction on the upper bound: x = +1.
As long as the relevant risks are not too large with respect to w0, NAM will arise in equilibrium. In
the case of DARA, NAM arises when the largest realizations of the risks are not too high. In particular,
the sorting pattern will be unambiguously negative assortative for all downside-only risks such as bad
weather, recession, war, etc. In the case of IARA, NAM arises as long as the lowest realizations of the
risks are not too low. In particular, NAM is always the case for upside-only risks such as economic
boom, technological progress, etc.
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One can go even further. For example, for IARA utility function, the concavity of the risk tolerance
is su¢ cient to guarantee NAM without imposing any restrictions on the support of the risks.18 Also,
for DARA and concave risk tolerance, which is commonly assumed in the literature when explaining
the risk premium puzzle (see Gollier, 2001), one can derive a su¢ cient condition that provides the exact
restriction on the upper bound as follows:
Proposition A3 If preference exhibits DARA and the risk tolerance is concave, then NAM arises if
x  T (0) + T (2w0 + x)
T 0 (0)
(49)
Proof. We must prove that both T (c(x))x and
T (z(x) c(x))
x are decreasing on the interval (0; x), where
x is given by (49). Dene g (c; x) , T 0 (c)x   (T (c) + T (x+ 2w0   c)) and we have T (c(x))x  0 i¤
g (c; x)  0. Taking the derivative of g w.r.t. c and x yields
@g
@c
= T 00 (c)x  (T 0 (c)  T 0 (x+ 2w0   c)) (50)
@g
@x
= T 0 (c)  T 0 (x+ 2w0   c) (51)
Suppose x > 0 and c > z   c. Combining (51) with T 00  0, we have @g@x < 0. Hence g (c; x)  g (c; 0) =
  (T (c) + T (2w0   c)) < 0. If c < z   c, combining with T 00  0 and substituting into (50) and (51)
yields g (c; x)  g (0; x) = T 0 (0)x   (T (0) + T (2w0 + x))  0, where the last inequality holds if (49)
holds. The proof of T (z(x) c(x))x being decreasing is similar.
To see the role of the linearity of risk tolerance, let us consider jT 00j  ". Then, (49) holds as
long as x 
q
4(T (0)+T 0(0)w0)
"   2w019 . Notice that
q
4(T (0)+T 0(0)w0)
"   2w0 is decreasing in " and thus
approaches innity as " goes to zero. This suggests that the more linear risk tolerance is, the fewer
restrictions we need to impose on the risk supports for NAM to arise.
18For x < 0, T 0 (c)x   (Ti + Tj)  T 0 (z)x   (T (c) + T (z   c))  T 0 (z)x   (T (0) + T (z))    (T (0) + T (2w0)) <
0 where the rst two inequalities are due to the fact that T 00  0, and the last inequality is due to the fact that
T 0 (z)x  (T (0) + T (z)) is a non-decreasing function of x for x < 0. Similarly T 0 (c)x  (Ti + Tj)  0 for x < 0. Hence
both T (c(x))
x
and T (z(x) c(x))
x
are decreasing for x < 0. This, combined with the fact that T (c(x))
x
and T (z(x) c(x))
x
are
decreasing for x > 0 if the utility belongs to IARA, ensures that the sorting pattern will be negative assortative.
19T (0) + T (2w0 + x)
= 2T (0) + T 0 (0) (2w0 + x) +
R 2w0+x
0
R s
0
T 00 (t) dtds
= T 0 (0)x+
h
2T (0) + 2T 0 (0)w0   "2 (2w0 + x)2
i
 T 0 (0)x if x 
q
4(T (0)+T 0(0)w0)
"   2w0.
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